a joint paper by two former heads of intelligence — Amarjeet Singh Dulat of RAW, and Asad Durrani of the ISI
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Cooperation can also help to guard against panic reactions: for example, unintended mobilisation of forces or possible nuclear alerts. Some intra- or extra-regional forces could cause crises that might spin out of control, with possible nuclear consequences. While the nuclear bogey should not be exaggerated, for these and other reasons it is advisable to establish a preventive mechanism; intelligence cooperation indeed being its lynchpin. Even in the worst days of the Cold War, the CIA and the KGB never ceased contacts, even through open declared officers in each other's capitals.
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Our two countries, India and Pakistan, have all the above reasons for covert, even overt, intelligence cooperation. Indeed, the two countries have taken related measures of a non-intelligence nature — some of them before going overtly nuclear in May 1998. During the Pakistan Army's multi-corps exercise in 1989, Zarb-E-Momin, India did not move its troops to the borders since its ambassador and military attachés in Islamabad were informed and observers invited. Similarly, when the Indian security forces were wrapping up Sikh militancy in the Punjab in 1992, Pakistan was duly informed, and perhaps even offered facilities to do ground checks. Post-nuclearisation, to avoid misunderstandings about their nuclear alert statuses, both countries have developed a reasonably functional system of exchanging information, including, importantly, forewarning missile testing.
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A Joint Anti-terror Mechanism (JATM) agreed upon after the 2006 NAM Summit in Havana hardly moved forward, leave alone achieve any success, especially given the Indian concerns in the aftermath of the 26/11 carnage. Terrorism cannot be addressed by a panchayat (committee);
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Cooperation can also help to guard against panic reactions: for example, unintended mobilisation of forces or possible nuclear alerts. Some intra- or extra-regional forces could cause crises that might spin out of control, with possible nuclear consequences. While the nuclear bogey should not be exaggerated, for these and other reasons it is advisable to establish a preventive mechanism; intelligence cooperation indeed being its lynchpin. Even in the worst days of the Cold War, the CIA and the KGB never ceased contacts, even through open declared officers in each other's capitals.
.
.
Our two countries, India and Pakistan, have all the above reasons for covert, even overt, intelligence cooperation. Indeed, the two countries have taken related measures of a non-intelligence nature — some of them before going overtly nuclear in May 1998. During the Pakistan Army's multi-corps exercise in 1989, Zarb-E-Momin, India did not move its troops to the borders since its ambassador and military attachés in Islamabad were informed and observers invited. Similarly, when the Indian security forces were wrapping up Sikh militancy in the Punjab in 1992, Pakistan was duly informed, and perhaps even offered facilities to do ground checks. Post-nuclearisation, to avoid misunderstandings about their nuclear alert statuses, both countries have developed a reasonably functional system of exchanging information, including, importantly, forewarning missile testing.
.
.
A Joint Anti-terror Mechanism (JATM) agreed upon after the 2006 NAM Summit in Havana hardly moved forward, leave alone achieve any success, especially given the Indian concerns in the aftermath of the 26/11 carnage. Terrorism cannot be addressed by a panchayat (committee);
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